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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CARMEL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16494 
TOWN OF CARMEL, 
Respondent. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & DONOGHUE (JOHN M. DONOGHUE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Carmel Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge against the Town of 
Carmel (Town). The PBA alleges that the Town violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to negotiate three "safety stipend" demands made 
by the PBA after the Town decided to assign "light duty" police 
officers to unassisted desk duty in regular uniform with weapon. 
Previously, light duty officers worked the desk with a full 
status officer, they wore a uniform different from that worn by 
the full status officers and they were not required to carry a 
weapon. The PBA demanded to bargain because it believes that the 
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Town's change in past practice, which it does not here contest, 
exposes the light duty officers and the full status officers to • 
greater on-the-job safety risks. 
By its first demand, the PBA seeks to have the light duty 
officers paid $100 each day they are assigned to unassisted desk 
duty. The ALT held this to be a prohibited subject of 
negotiation because it conflicted with the provisions of General 
Municipal Law (GML) §207-c(3),. as interpreted, which authorize 
and regulate light duty assignments for police officers. Under 
the PBA's other demands, full status officers would be paid a 
stipend of $15 per hour when in station with a prisoner, and $10 
per hour when otherwise on shift, if only a light duty officer is 
assigned to desk duty. The ALT held these two demands to be 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation because they are "punitive", 
relying again upon GML „§207-c(3) and a finding that the demands 
do not have a reasonable relationship to job hazards. 
The PBA argues that the ALT erred as a matter of law because 
all of its demands are mandatory subjects of negotiation. The 
Town in response argues that the ALT's decision is correct on the 
law in all respects. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we reverse the ALT's decision and hold all three 
demands to be mandatorily negotiable. 
The PBA's first demand is for a wage stipend for light duty 
officers. The ALT held this demand prohibited from negotiation 
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by GML §207-c(3) as interpreted in Schenectady Police Benevolent 
Association v. PERB (hereafter Schenectady).^ 
GML §207-c(3) provides that a police officer who is properly 
assigned to light duty shall "continue to be entitled to his 
regular salary or wages, including increases thereof and fringe 
benefits, to which he would have been entitled if he were able to 
perform his regular duties." The ALJ held that this provision of 
the GML prohibited a light duty officer from being paid more than 
a full status officer. Finding that the PBA's first demand would 
vary that legislative scheme, the ALJ held it to be a prohibited 
subject of negotiation. We do not believe, however, that the 
ALJ's decision reflects a correct reading of GML §207-c(3). 
Properly viewed, GML §2 07-c(3) is an entitlement program for 
both employers and employees. A municipality's assignment of a 
police officer to light duty is not a requirement, it is a 
privilege to be elected by a municipality at its option, 
circumstances permitting. The exercise of that option, however, 
is not unrestricted. The officer, for example, must be capable 
of performing light duty and the assignments given to the officer 
must be consistent with police officer status. The refusal of a 
proper light duty assignment extinguishes the officer's 
entitlement to the benefits of GML §2 07-c. Once on light duty, 
police officers are entitled under GML §209-c(3) to their regular 
salary and wages. 
^85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB f7005 (1995). 
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GML §207-c(3) reflects a legislative policy that police 
officers who suffer line-of-duty injury or illness should not 
have their wages or salary adversely affected because of that 
injury or illness, even if they are thereby rendered unable to 
perform the full range of a police officer's duties. Therefore, 
GML §207-c(3) specifically provides that even those whom the 
employer has placed on light duty must continue to receive that 
which they would have received if they were able to perform their 
regular duties as police officers. 
We interpret GML §207-c(3) to be a guaranteed minimum wage 
for light duty police officers. Like other minimum wage ., 
statutes, GML §207-c(3) may establish a floor below which an 
employer may not go, at least not unilaterally, but it does not 
prohibit the payment by an employer of more than the statutory 
minimum, and certainly not when that payment is made pursuant to 
a collective bargaining agreement entered into by two parties who 
are under a continuing, statutory duty to negotiate all terms and 
conditions of employment, including wages. 
The compulsory negotiation of wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment reflects the broad and sweeping public 
policy of the State.-7 As relevant in this case, an exemption 
from that wage bargaining obligation would arise only from a 
plain and clear statement of a legislative intent to effect that 
-
7Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York 
v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 57012 (1990); Cohoes City Sch. 
Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 9 PERB [^7529 
(1976). 
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result either expressly or by inescapable implication.-'' The 
ALJ found implicit evidence of that intent in a GML §207-c 
legislative scheme, which he construed to prohibit light duty 
officers from ever being paid more than full status officers. 
Light duty officers, however, are simply and obviously not 
similarly situated to full status officers. They are in some way 
disabled from the full performance of their duties either by 
injury or illness. We do not believe that any of the provisions 
of GML §2 07-c can reasonably be read to prohibit two parties to a 
bargaining relationship from negotiating a wage differential 
which takes into consideration those disabilities or illnesses, 
even if those negotiations result in light duty officers being 
paid more than full status officers who do not share the same 
conditions of work, if for no other reason than they are not 
disabled. We take no position, of course, on the merits of the 
demand that the light duty officers be paid any more money 
because of - the risks associated with their job assignments or for 
any other reason. Whether they should be paid more money and, if 
so, how much, are matters to be resolved in conjunction with the 
parties' negotiations. 
Schenectady does not conflict and, indeed, is in accord with 
our decision here. The Court of Appeals held in Schenectady that 
the employer was not required to bargain orders requiring 
employees to submit to light duty or to submit to surgery to 
correct disabling physical conditions because the express 
^Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 619, 23 PERB 57013 
(1990) . 
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provisions of GML §2 07-c give an employer the specific right to 
make such orders. As to a medical confidentiality waiver, 
however, the Court in Schenectady concluded that bargaining was 
required except to the limited extent the waiver was necessary 
for the employer's determination of the nature of the officer's 
medical problem and its relationship to his or her duties. A 
broader waiver, noted the Court, was bargainable because it could 
not be tied to any of the express provisions of GML §2 07-c or 
anything "inescapably implicit" therein. 
In contrast to the light duty and surgery orders in 
Schenectady, the prohibition against the negotiation of a higher 
wage rate for light duty officers does not rest upon any express 
) terms of GML §207-c. Rather, the ALT found the prohibition 
implicit in a GML §207-c legislative scheme. As with the medical 
confidentiality waiver in Schenectadyf there is nothing 
"inescapably implicit" in GML §2 07-c which either would prohibit 
the negotiation of light duty officers' salary or wages in the 
manner proposed by the PBA or which would render the negotiation 
of such supplemental wages nonmandatory. 
As to the proposals submitted by the PBA on behalf of the 
full status officers, the ALT appears to have found them 
nonmandatory for three reasons. 
Again relying on GML §2 07-c(3), the ALT first concluded that 
a light duty officer is statutorily deemed to be fit for duty 
and, therefore, light duty status is "not an appropriate basis to 
J
 attempt to distinguish between officers". Light duty officers, 
however, are not fit for all duty. By definition, such officers 
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are fit for only some duty, unlike the full status officers. 
Their medical condition arguably exposes both them and the 
persons they work with to greater health and safety risks. Just 
as the PBA may negotiate wage increases for the light duty 
officers, so too may it negotiate wage increases for the full 
status officers who perceive themselves to be adversely affected 
by the unassisted assignment of armed light duty officers to desk 
duty. 
The ALJ also relied on the absence of a claim by the PBA 
that regular officers were required to do additional tasks once 
the light duty officers were assigned to unassisted desk duty. 
Increased workload, however, is not the basis for the PBA's 
demand and it is not just increased workload which would entitle 
the PBA to have its salary demands negotiated. These are wage 
demands premised upon an admitted change in an assignment 
practice, which change has allegedly and arguably exposed the 
officers to greater peril on the job. 
The third basis for the ALJ's decision is that there is no 
reasonable relationship between the demands for the full status 
officers and the circumstances prompting them, thus rendering 
them punitive in nature. It is unclear to us exactly what the 
ALJ was conveying by this last stated rationale. If it is that 
the PBA was required to affirmatively prove factually that the 
assignment change adversely affected the health and safety of 
either the light duty officers or the full status officers as a 
condition to any right to negotiate pursuant to demand, then we 
reject that construction of its bargaining rights. The duty to 
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negotiate hinges on the subject matter of the demand, not the 
facts of the particular case.-7 The subject in issue here is 
wages for safety risks, clearly a mandatory subject of 
negotiation that, for the reasons previously discussed, has been 
neither prohibited nor exempted from compulsory negotiation. The 
AKT's citation to the decision in Village of Spring Valley 
Policemen's Benevolent Association-7 (Spring Valley) suggests, 
however, that this is not what the ALT was conveying. The only 
alternative interpretation of the ALJ's last stated rationale is 
that he believed his result was required or allowed by Spring 
Valley. Spring Valley, however, does not require or support the 
ALJ's decision and, if anything, is contrary to it. 
In Spring Valley, demands for premium pay for risks police 
officers might encounter if their employer were to exercise 
managerial prerogatives regarding minimum staffing levels and the 
provision of certain equipment were held to be mandatorily 
negotiable. An argument that the demands were nonmandatory as 
penalties was specifically rejected. A penalty was considered to 
arise if the demand in issue "bears no reasonable relationship to 
a particular hazard or to other circumstances affecting working 
conditions [the demand] is designed to compensate."-7 There is 
at least as much a reasonable relationship between the PBA's 
"safety stipends" and the exercise of the managerial prerogative 
i7State of New York fDep't of Transp.1 , 27 PERB ?[3056 (1994) . 
i714 PERB 53010 (1981) . 
^
7Id. at 3 017. 
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in this case as there was between the "premium pay" demands and 
the exercise of managerial prerogatives in Spring Valley. We 
surely cannot say reasonably that the unassisted assignment of 
armed light duty officers to desk duty poses no greater risks to 
either those officers or those whose work brings them into 
contact with them than when the assignment practice was 
distinctly different. 
Furthermore, the ALJ's observation that there has been "no 
change or quid pro quo for additional compensation" represents 
the very type of disguised merits evaluation Spring Valley and 
all other of our negotiability decisions strive to avoid. It is 
not our role to decide whether a bargaining demand is reasonable 
or justifiable on any basis, factual or otherwise. The only 
question before us in these types of cases is negotiability, not 
whether or to what extent the demands should be accepted. Our 
holding that these demands are mandatorily negotiable means only 
that the Town must bargain them, not that it must grant them or 
make concessions pursuant to them. Whether any of these officers 
deserve to be paid any more money is a question affecting only 
the merits of the demands, not their negotiability. 
The parties' contractual management rights clause does not 
afford the Town any defense to this charge. The clause merely 
preserves the Town's rights and responsibilities as applicable 
under law. The Town had no legal right not to bargain the PBA's 
proposals. Rather, its responsibility was to do so pursuant to 
demand. 
Board - U-16494 
-10 
For the reasons, and to the extent, set forth above, the 
PBA's exceptions are granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
The Town is hereby ordered to negotiate the demands as presented 
to the Town in the PBA's letter dated January 12, 1995, and to 
sign and post notice in the form attached in all locations at 
which notices of information to PBA unit employees are ordinarily 
posted. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, 
£x-
Chairperson 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Town of Carmel Police Benevolent Associatoin, Inc. (PBA) that 
the Town of Carmel will negotiate the safety stipend demands as presented to it in the PBA's letter dated January 12,1995. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF CARMEL 
) , . . J Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15660 
CITY OF BUFFALO (POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Respondent. 
W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
EDWARD D. PEACE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (JAMES L. JARVIS, JR., of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA) and the City of Buffalo (Police Department) (City) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the PBA's charge 
against the City. The PBA alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it changed its practice of always appointing or promoting the first 
of the three eligible candidates on a civil service list 
notwithstanding the "rule of three" in Civil Service Law §61 
(CSL) . y 
•^CSL §61 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Appointment or promotion from an eligible list to a 
position in the competitive class shall be made by the 
selection of one of the three persons certified by the 
appropriate civil service commission as standing 
highest on such eligibility list who are willing to 
accept such appointment or promotion . . . . 
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On a stipulated record, the ALJ dismissed the charge on two 
grounds. The first ground was that the PBA had not established a 
past practice of always appointing or promoting the first person on 
the civil service eligible list. As exemplified by the four times 
the City had not chosen the first person on the eligible list for 
promotion to a police lieutenant position, the ALJ concluded that 
each appointment or promotion the City made over many years 
involved a discretionary decision. Second, the ALJ held that the 
subject matter of the claimed practice encompassed a permissive 
subject of negotiation. Therefore, even if the practice had 
existed as alleged by the PBA, the City's unilateral change in that 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation would not violate the City's 
duty to negotiate. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that it established a past 
practice for purposes of the Act as a matter of fact and law and 
that the practice embraces a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The City argues in its cross-exceptions that the practice 
alleged encompasses a prohibited subject of bargaining, but, if 
not, the subject is at least nonmandatory as the ALJ held. In 
addition, the City argues that the ALJ was correct in finding that 
there was no past practice of the type alleged by the PBA. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge on the 
ground that the alleged practice encompasses a subject which is at 
least a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. In affirming on this 
basis, it is not necessary for us to decide (and we do not) whether 
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there is an established past practice, as alleged by the PBA, or 
whether, as alleged by the City, such a practice is a prohibited 
subject of bargaining. 
It has been held repeatedly and consistently, under a wide 
variety of circumstances, that the qualifications for appointment 
or promotion are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation.-7 
The Court of Appeals, in Cassidy v. Municipal Civil Service 
Commission-7 (hereafter Cassidy), held specifically that factors 
other than test scores on a civil service examination are relevant 
to a municipality's decision to hire or promote and may be 
considered. In reaching its decision, the Court in Cassidy stated 
the following, which is central to our disposition of this case: 
An individual's ability to achieve a high examination 
score does not necessarily demonstrate his capacity to 
perform the actual duties of a particular position. 
Moreover, examination success cannot reveal any possible 
defects of personality, character or disposition which 
may impair the performance of one's duties in a civil 
service position, [citations omitted] Hence, of 
necessity, the appointing authority must be cloaked with 
the power to choose a qualified appointee who possesses 
^State of New York - Unified Court System, 25 PERB H3065 (1992) 
(definition of promotion units nonmandatory as inextricably 
intertwined with the determination of employment qualifications); 
Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB ^3022 (1988) 
(determination of qualifications for filling positions and job 
assignments nonmandatory); Rensselaer City Sch. Dist., 13 PERB 
J3051 (1980), conf'd, 87 A.D.2d 711, 15 PERB 5[7003 (3d Dep't 
1982) (criteria for promotion); Fairview Professional 
Firefighters Ass'n, Inc., Local 1586, 12 PERB H3083 (1979) 
(qualifications for promotion); Incorporated Village of 
Hempstead, 11 PERB f3 072 (1978) (qualifications for appointment); 
Onondaga Community College, 11 PERB [^3045 (1978) (qualifications 
for appointment) ; Somers Faculty Ass'n, 9 PERB ^3 014 (197 6) 
(management prerogative for an employer to offer employment to 
whomever it wishes subject to requirements of law). 
^37 N.Y.2d 526 (1975). 
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all the attributes necessary for the responsible 
performance of his duties. (37 N.Y.2d at 529) 
The practice alleged to exist by the PBA makes a test score, 
and the accompanying placement on a civil service list, the sole 
basis for an appointment or promotion to a competitive class 
position. Under this practice, test score alone would establish 
absolutely who the City could hire or promote. But a test score is 
only one evidence of qualification for a position. As Cassidy 
makes clear, there are other relevant qualifications for a ' 
competitive class position which may be considered by a 
municipality. The practice asserted by the PBA plainly prohibits 
the City from considering these other, relevant qualifications in 
making an appointment. Therefore, the practice asserted is a major 
substantive limitation on the City's managerial right to determine 
employment qualifications. As such, no persuasive argument can be 
made that the alleged practice is merely procedural in nature. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AKJ's dismissal of the 
charge on the ground that the subject of the alleged practice is 
nonmandatory is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. fcinsella,' Chairperson 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST SENECA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15978 
TOWN OP WEST SENECA (POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Respondent. 
W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JAECKLE, FLEISCHMANN & MU6EL (PHILIP H. McINTYRE 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the West Seneca Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) and the Town of West Seneca (Police Department) 
(Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) on the 
PBA's charge against the Town. The PBA alleges that the Town 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it changed a practice of always appointing or promoting 
the first of the three eligible candidates on a civil service list 
notwithstanding the "rule of three" in Civil Service Law §61 
(CSL) A' 
CSL §61 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Appointment or promotion from an eligible list to a 
position in the competitive class shall be made by the 
selection of one of the three persons certified by the 
appropriate Civil Service Commission as standing 
highest on such eligibility list who are willing to 
accept such appointment or promotion . . . . 
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The ALT dismissed the charge on the ground that the subject 
matter of the claimed practice encompasses a permissive subject of 
negotiation. In so holding, the ALJ relied upon her decision in 
City of Buffalo,-/ which we have this date affirmed in relevant 
part. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the practice alleged 
embraces.a mandatory subject of negotiation. The Town takes 
exception to the ALJ's having made any findings of fact regarding 
the existence of a past practice which, in any event, it argues 
encompasses a prohibited subject of bargaining. If not a 
prohibited subject, the Town argues that the alleged practice is at 
least nonmandatory and the ALJ, therefore, properly dismissed the 
charge. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision on the basis of our 
decision this date in City of Buffalo, which we incorporate by 
reference. The qualifications for employment or promotion are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The practice alleged by the 
PBA would prohibit the Town from considering anything other than 
civil service test score rank in making an appointment. It is, 
therefore, at least a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
Having affirmed the ALJ's decision on this basis, we do not 
consider the Town's cross-exceptions. 
^29 PERB 54515, aff'd, 29 PERB [^3023 (1996). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 15, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
that the charge must be, and it 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILBERT MOORE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16394 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
WILBERT MOORE, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (CLAUDE I. HERSH Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DAVID BASS, GENERAL COUNSEL (THOMAS LIESE of counsel), 
for Employer. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Wilbert Moore 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his 
charge which alleges that the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) and the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) had violated, respectively, §209-a.2(c) and 
§2 09-a.l(c) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
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(Act) .-' After two conferences in this matter, the ALT prepared 
a statement of facts of the case, which was accepted by all 
parties. UFT and the District then moved to dismiss the charge 
and Moore responded. Thereafter, the ALT issued her decision, 
finding that UFT had not breached its duty of fair representation 
when a UFT representative, not an attorney, represented Moore at 
a grievance arbitration and when it failed to advise him before 
the arbitration that the District would be represented by 
counsel. The ALT further found that UFT had not violated the Act 
by failing to inform the arbitrator of facts which Moore believed 
to be relevant to the arbitration. 
Moore argues in his exceptions-7 only that the ALT erred in 
determining that the facts that he wanted UFT to present at 
arbitration would not have affected the arbitrator's decision 
because they were not relevant to the issues raised in the 
arbitration. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALT. 
-'The case was processed as to the §209-a.2(c) allegation only. 
The District thus appears as a statutory party only pursuant to 
§209-a.3 of the Act. 
-'After Moore filed exceptions to the ALT's decision and after 
UFT and the District filed their responses to Moore's exceptions, 
Moore filed a document which he called "final exceptions". Moore 
made no request for permission to file such additional 
exceptions; UFT and the District object to his filing and, since 
neither UFT nor the District filed cross-exceptions, Moore is not 
even entitled to file a response thereto, much less additional 
exceptions, under Rules of Procedure, §2 04.11. We have not, 
therefore, considered Moore's final exceptions in reaching our 
decision herein. 
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Moore raises in his exception arguments which go to the 
District's decision to excess him from his position as a regular 
substitute teacher at P.S. 58. Whether the District's conduct 
was consistent with the terms of its collective bargaining 
agreement with UFT was decided by an arbitrator, who found no 
violation of the contract by the District. The arbitrator 
considered various arguments raised by both the UFT and the 
District in reaching his decision. Moore argues that the UFT 
failed to introduce evidence in support of various arguments he 
wanted UFT to make at arbitration. A review of the record, 
however, shows that as to some of those arguments, UFT, in fact, 
presented evidence to the arbitrator. The other points were not 
raised by UFT, but the ALJ found, and we agree, that those 
arguments were not relevant to the issue before the arbitrator. 
As found by the ALJ, there is nothing in the record which could 
support a finding that UFT's actions at arbitration were 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Moore's exceptions and 
affirm the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 15,, 1996 
Albany, New York 
fA )S 
:~ 1. % 
A 
y\^U, . Pau'line R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J.ySchmertz, Member \j 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHUYLERVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17413 
SCHUYLERVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD W. HORWITZ, for Charging Party 
RUBERTI, GIRVEN & FERLAZZO, P.C. (JAMES E. GIRVIN, ESQ. 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Schuylerville Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing its charge 
that the Schuylerville Central School District (District) 
violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by failing to pay a salary increment after 
the expiration of the parties7 1993-1995 collective bargaining 
agreement. The Association was notified by the Director that its 
charge was deficient but declined to withdraw it. Based on the 
pleadings in the charge that the 1993-1995 agreement included a 
continuation clause that specifically excluded salary increments, 
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the Director determined that the expired agreement contained a 
"sunset clause". He accordingly found that there was no 
violation of the Act when the District did not pay salary 
increments after the agreement's expiration.-7 
The Association excepts to the Director's decision, arguing 
that §209-a.l(e) of the Act cannot be negated by a collective 
bargaining agreement, that there is no clear and explicit waiver 
by the Association of its §209-a.l(e) rights, that it has not 
forfeited its §209-a.l(e) rights by engaging in any strike, and 
that its agreement to the language in the 1993-1995 agreement is 
not a surrender of its rights under §209-a.1(e) of the Act. The 
District argues in its response to the Association's exceptions 
that the Director's decision is correct and must be affirmed. 
Based upon a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
The Director relied on our decision in Waterford-Halfmoon 
Union Free School District-7 in determining to dismiss the 
Association's charge. In that case, we considered, and rejected, 
the same arguments raised here by the Association. Section 
-'Article IV (B) of the Association-District contract provides: 
All terms and conditions of employment shall remain in 
full force and effect until a successor agreement is 
reached, excluding increments. 
^27 PERB J[3070 (1994) . 
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2 09-a.l(e)3/
 0f the Act continues in effect after contract 
expiration only what the parties have agreed upon in their 
contract. If they have agreed that a term of a contract will end 
as of a certain date or upon a certain condition, §2 09-a.l(e) 
does not and cannot continue in effect that which they have 
agreed to terminate for that would extend to a charging party 
something more than that which had been agreed upon. By 
honoring, after contract expiration, the parties' agreement to 
end a term of their contract, we give full effect to §209-a.l(e) 
because their agreement was to terminate the benefit at contract 
expiration. The Association has not made any new legal arguments 
which would distinguish Waterford-Halfmoon or necessitate a 
modification of that decision. While the Association argues in 
its exceptions that the intent to remove increments from the 
coverage of §209-a.l(e) "must be manifested by plain and clear 
language", that language is plainly evident in Article IV (B) of 
the parties' last agreement. It provides for a continuation of 
all terms of the agreement except increments. Having agreed that 
salary increments would not be paid after contract expiration, 
the District was not under any statutory obligation to continue 
those payments. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in 
-/Section 209-a.l(e) provides that it is an improper practice for 
a public employer to refuse to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated, unless the 
employee organization which is a party to such agreement has, 
during such negotiations, engaged in a strike. 
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Waterford-Halfmoon, we deny the Association's exceptions and 
affirm the Director's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1180, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14657 
CONVENTION CENTER OPERATING CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM F. HENNING, for Charging Party 
JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN (ANDREW A. PETERSON and 
JOSEPH M. MARTIN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Convention 
Center Operating Corporation (Center) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that it had violated 
§209^.1(3) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act)-7 by discharging John Allen and Frank Calderon for the 
exercise of protected rights in organizing for and supporting 
Local 1180, Communications Workers of America (CWA). 
In its exceptions, the Center argues that the ALJ erred in 
finding that the Center was aware of Allen's and Calderon's 
activities on behalf of CWA, that they would not have been 
-
7The ALJ dismissed the allegation that §209-a.l(b) of the Act 
had been violated. No exceptions were taken to that part of the 
ALJ's decision. 
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terminated but for their exercise of protected rights, that they 
received disparate treatment by the Center, and that the Center's 
reasons for their termination were pretextual. CWA supports the 
AKT's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Allen and Calderon were employed as control monitor 
technicians (CMTs) at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center in 
New York City, which is operated by the Center.-7 They, and the 
other six CMTs, were unrepresented in February 1993, when CWA 
filed a representation petition with the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) seeking to 
represent CMTs in a separate unit.-7 The Center opposed the 
petition, arguing that the CMTs were most appropriately placed in 
a unit of public safety officers (PSOs) represented by Local 237 
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). A hearing 
regarding the uniting question was held on April 26, 1993, at 
which, as here relevant, Calderon and Henry Flinter, the Center's 
inspector general and director of safety, were present. The 
-
7Calderon began employment at the Center in 1986 and Allen had 
been employed since 1990. 
-
7CWA represents a unit of public safety officer supervisors 
employed by the Center and sought, alternatively, to place the 
CMTs in that unit. 
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Director's decision, issued on October 25, 1993, placed the CMTs 
in the unit represented by the IBT.-7 
Calderon and Allen had been active in soliciting signatures 
of the other CMTs on CWA membership cards and speaking to their 
fellow employees about the benefits of joining the CWA. Indeed, 
Flinter acknowledged that he knew that all the CMTs had signed 
cards designating CWA as their collective bargaining 
representative. The ALJ concluded, based upon all the evidence 
before him, and we find that the record supports his conclusion, 
that Calderon and Allen were engaged in protected activities and 
that Flinter was aware of those activities.-7 
As CMTs, Calderon and Allen were assigned to the 12:00 a.m. 
to 8:00 a.m. shift in the Center's command center, where they 
were responsible for the general security of the Center. They 
monitored alarm systems, video cameras and video screens in the 
command center and dispatched PSOs to any area of the building in 
which a problem arose; they also monitored the heating,.air 
conditioning and lighting systems. In the early morning hours of 
June 14, 1993, Allen and Calderon were at work at the Center. 
-'New York Convention Center Operating Corp. , 2 6 PERB [^4 052 
(1993), aff'd. 27 PERB f3034' (1994). 
-
7The ALJ relied in part on our decision in Citv of Corning, 
17 PERB ^3022 (1984), conf'd, 116 A.D. 2d 1042, 19 PERB fl7004 
(4th Dep't 1986), to establish that it could be inferred that 
Flinter had knowledge of not only Allen's and Calderon's support 
of the CWA but of their organizing efforts on behalf of CWA 
because of the small size of the command center operation. There 
is nothing in the record which would warrant the contrary finding 
sought by the Center. 
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Flinter and two other members of management went to the Center to 
conduct a surprise inspection, pursuant to a request from Fabian 
Palomino, the Center's director, who had received reports that 
employees on that shift had been sleeping while on duty. The 
supervisor's log book filled in by Flinter at the time of his 
visit indicated that he and his team had found Myles Delvitt, a 
PSO stationed at the 39th Street entrance to the Center, asleep 
in his guard booth. Melville Anderson, the PSO on duty at the 
reception desk in the Center, was also noted as being asleep. 
Allen and Calderon were likewise noted to be asleep in the 
command center. Thereafter, on June 16, 1993, Allen was fired by 
Flinter and the next day Calderon was also discharged by Flinter 
for sleeping while on duty.^ 
Flinter testified initially that Delvitt and Anderson were 
not asleep. However, on cross-examination, when he was shown the 
log book for the first time, he did admit that he would not have 
noted in the log book that the two were asleep if they were not. 
He testified then that he thought Anderson was only nodding, not 
sleeping, and that he did not personally see Delvitt asleep but 
that one of his colleagues must have told him that Delvitt was 
asleep as they passed by his security booth on their way into the 
Center. Flinter testified that no discipline was warranted for 
Anderson because, despite what he had noted in the log book, 
Anderson was not actually asleep on duty. He further testified 
-
7Flinter had recommended to Palomino that Allen and Calderon be 
terminated and Palomino concurred with Flinter's decision. 
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that he had intended to terminate Delvitt but Delvitt went out on 
extended medical leave and, shortly thereafter, Flinter left the 
employ of the Center.-7 Finding the Center's witnesses, 
including Flinter, to be evasive and less than credible, the ALJ 
found that all four employees had been discovered sleeping by 
Flinter but that he chose only to terminate Allen and Calderon. 
Having found that Allen and Calderon were engaged in activities 
protected by the Act, that Flinter had knowledge of those 
activities, and that Allen and Calderon had received disparate 
treatment when the Center terminated them and not Anderson and 
Delvitt, the ALJ concluded that the Center violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Act when it dismissed Allen and Calderon. He 
further found that the reasons offered by the Center in 
justification for its treatment of Allen and Calderon were 
pretextual. 
The Center argues to us that the ALJ erred when he rejected 
its rationale for its actions towards Allen and Calderon. It 
claims that the ALJ relied upon evidence of the Center's 
treatment of employees in different titles by supervisory 
employees other than Flinter in finding that the Center had 
treated Allen and Calderon in a discriminatory fashion. While 
the ALJ discussed the fact that other Center employees, all of 
whom were PSOs, were not terminated for a first offense of 
sleeping on the job, he relied primarily on the contradictory 
^Delvitt was apparently written up for his infraction but was 
not terminated. 
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nature of Flinter's testimony and the disparate treatment applied 
to Allen and Calderon as compared to Anderson and Delvitt. He 
also rejected the Center's argument that the discharge of Allen 
and Calderon was warranted by the fact that they were CMTs as 
opposed to PSOs and, therefore, had a higher level of 
responsibility. The A U correctly found that the CMTs and PSOs 
worked together and were jointly responsible for the Center's 
security. That is the same conclusion reached by the Director in 
the earlier representation matter and, in fact, was the very 
position espoused by the Center in that proceeding. Indeed, 
Flinter, the individual responsible for seeking to discipline the 
employees, drew no distinction between the responsibilities of 
Allen and Calderon and those of Anderson and Delvitt in weighing 
the seriousness of their offense. 
To establish the improper motivation necessary for a finding 
that §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act have been violated, the 
charging party has the burden of proving engagement in protected 
activities, that the employer had knowledge of the activities and 
that it acted because of those activities.-7 If a prima facie 
violation has been established by direct evidence or by 
circumstantial evidence,-7 the burden shifts to the respondent 
to rebut that violation by proof that legitimate business reasons 
g/Citv of Salamanca, 18 PERB fl3 012 (1985) . 
-
7It is germane to note the timing of Allen's and Calderon's 
termination just two months after the hearing in the 
representation petition and before the issuance of the Director's 
decision placing the CMTs in the unit represented by IBT. 
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prompted the action.^ As the ALT found, the Center failed to 
meet that burden. 
Rather, the record fully supports the ALJ's conclusion that 
Flinter was aware of Allen's and Calderon's exercise of protected 
rights and that they would not have been terminated but for the 
exercise of those rights. The reasons offered by the Center for 
its termination of Allen and Calderon were rejected by the AKT as 
pretextual and further support his determination that the 
terminations of Allen and Calderon were improperly motivated, in 
violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act.^7 The record 
affords no basis for a reversal of the ALJ's credibility 
resolutions or conclusions of fact. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions of the Center are 
denied and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Center: 
1. Forthwith offer John Allen and Frank Calderon 
reinstatement to their former positions. 
2. Make John Allen and Frank Calderon whole for any loss of 
pay and benefits suffered by reason of their 
termination, from the date thereof to the date of the 
offer of reinstatement, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
—^Citv of Utica, 24 PERB f3044 (1991) . 
^Stockbridge Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. , 26 PERB [^3007 (1993). 
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3. Cease and desist from terminating the employment of John 
Allen and Frank Calderon for the exercise of rights 
protected by the Act. 
4. Sign and conspicuously post the attached notice at all 
locations used throughout the Center to communicate 
with employees in the public safety department who are 
represented by Local 1180, Communications Workers of 
America and Local 237, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters.— * 
DATED: May 15, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
rJL.£ 
\ 
<-AA<£(V> 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
12/ 
-'Because both employee organizations represent employees in the 
public safety department, and the unit which CWA sought to 
represent is now represented by IBT, all of the employees in the 
public safety department should have notice of our decision. See 
County of Orleans, 25 PERB 53010 (1992) . 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Local 1180, Communications Workers of America that the 
Convention Center Operating Corporation will: 
1. Forthwith offer John Allen and Frank Calderon reinstatement to their former positions. 
2. Make John Allen and Frank Calderon whole for any loss of pay and benefits suffered by reason of their 
termination, from the date thereof to the date of the offer of reinstatement, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
3. Not terminate the employment of John Allen and Frank Calderon for the exercise of rights protected by the Act. 
Dated By . 
(Representative) (Title) 
CONVENTION CENTER OPERATING CORPORATION 
777/s Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SIDNEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-13923 
& U-14052 
SIDNEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
MARK PETTITT, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sidney 
Teachers Association (Association) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) dismissing its charges that the Sidney 
Central School District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it assigned 
certain duties previously performed exclusively by unit school 
nurse teachers (SNT) to nonunit employees. 
Some description of the history of the processing of these 
charges is necessary before we discuss the Association's 
exceptions. The charges were filed in 1992. Case No. U-13923 
alleges that the District violated the Act when, in June and 
August of 1992, it assigned registered nurses to assist the 
school physician in the performance of school athletic physicals, 
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a job previously performed, the Association alleges, by an SNT. 
The District's answer admitted the assignment to and performance 
of the duties in question by nonunit employees, but denied that 
the work was exclusive unit work and raised several affirmative 
defenses.-7 Case.No. U-14052 alleges a similar violation with 
respect to other SNT duties.-7 
The charges were thereafter conditionally dismissed, but 
were reopened at the Association's request,-7 and consolidated 
for hearing before the Assistant Director. After the hearing, 
the charges were dismissed by the Assistant Director upon his 
finding that the Association had failed to meet the notice of 
claim requirements of Education Law §3813.-7 The Association 
filed exceptions, which we sustained in part and dismissed in 
part.-7 As to Case No. U-13 92 3, we held that the Association 
-
7The Association alleged, and the District admitted, that on or 
about August 6, 7, 12, and 19, 1992, registered nurses who were 
not members of the bargaining unit performed duties relating to 
the assisting of the district physician in the conducting of 
summer 1992 student athletic physical examinations. 
-
7The Association filed a letter in December 1992, attempting to 
amend the charge to allege similar conduct by the District 
between August and September 1992. As the letter was not sworn 
to and there was no proof that it had properly been served on the 
District, as required by PERB's Rules of Procedure, it was not 
accepted as an amendment to the charge. Thereafter, on January 
13, 1993, the Association filed an amendment which was accepted 
by the assigned Administrative Law Judge and which made the same 
allegations. 
^
725 PERB H4675 (1992) and 26 PERB [^4649 (1993). 
PERB 54591 (1995). 
PERB [^3066 (1995) . 
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had not met the ninety-day notice requirement of Education Law 
§3813 with respect to the transfers of unit work which took place 
in June 1992.-1 As to the August 1992 transfers of unit work 
and the transfers alleged in U-14 052, the case was remanded to 
the Assistant Director for further processing. On remand, the 
Assistant Director determined that as to the allegations of 
transfer of unit work in August 1992 set forth in Case No. 
U-13923, the Association had met the requirements of Education 
Law §3813. He dismissed that charge, however, because he found 
that the Association had not proven that unit work had been 
performed by nonunit personnel. He dismissed all of Case No. U-
14052, finding that the Association had not complied with the 
notice of claim requirements of §3813 of the Education Law. 
The Association excepts to the Assistant Director's 
decision, arguing that the assignment of unit work-7 to nonunit 
employees in August 1992 had been admitted by the District in its 
answer to the charge in Case No. U-13923. It also argues that 
the Assistant Director erred in finding that its charge and 
"amendment" in Case No. U-14052 were not filed within ninety days 
^In Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 214 A.D.2d 288, 28 PERB 
5[7013 (3d Dep't 1995) , the Appellate Division held that where no 
separate notice of claim has been tendered to a school district, 
the notice of claim provisions of §3813 of the Education Law are 
nonetheless satisfied if the school district's governing body 
receives a copy of an improper practice charge which is 
sufficiently detailed within 90 days after the claims asserted in 
the charge accrued. 
-
7For the purposes of his decision, the Assistant Director 
assumed, without specifically so finding, that the at-issue work 
was exclusive to the unit. 
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of the occurrence of the acts complained of, as required by 
Education Law §3813. The District has not responded to the 
Association's exceptions and it has not filed cross-exceptions. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
Association's exceptions, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in 
part, the Assistant Director's decision. 
We reverse the Assistant Director's dismissal of the charge 
in Case No. U-13923. The Association alleges in its charge that 
in August 1992 registered nurses "performed duties relating to 
the assisting of the District medical physician in the conducting 
of Summer 1992 student athletic physical examinations". The 
District's answer admitted these allegations, but denied that the 
duties were exclusive to the unit SNTs. For the purposes of his 
decision the Assistant Director assumed that the at-issue work 
was exclusive to the unit represented by the Association. 
However, he dismissed the charge for lack of proof because the 
Association's witness, Lynne Dionne, the SNT who, in prior years, 
had assisted the school physician in the performance of the 
student athletic physicals, was not present at the time the work 
was performed by the registered nurses and she could not identify 
with specificity the duties that they performed. 
The Association excepts to the Assistant Director's failure 
to rely upon the District's admission in its answer that in 
August 1992 the nonunit registered nurses performed the at-issue 
work. The Assistant Director disregarded the admission in the 
District's answer and focused on the testimony of the 
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Association's witness, who testified that she did not perform the 
work in question in 1992 although only she, as an SNT, had done 
so in prior years. She further testified that the registered 
nurses had performed the work in 1992, although she did not 
specifically see them do so. The Assistant Director discounted 
her testimony as being of less value than hearsay. We, however, 
find that the testimony, coupled with the District's admission, 
is more than sufficient evidence to sustain the charge, for it is 
certainly well-settled that an admission in a verified answer is 
evidence of the fact admitted.-7 As noted above, the Assistant 
Director, for the purposes of his decision, assumed that the work 
in question was bargaining unit work. While the District denied 
in its answer that the assisting of the school physician in the 
conduct of the summer student athletic physicals was exclusive 
bargaining unit work, no evidence was produced by the District in 
support of that position. In fact, the record supports a finding 
that the SNT, specifically Dionne, was the only employee who 
assisted the school physician in the conduct of the summer 
student athletic physicals, and we so find. Therefore, as the 
District in the summer of 1992 unilaterally assigned nonunit 
registered nurses to assist the school physician in the conduct 
of summer student athletic physicals, work substantially similar 
to that which had previously been performed exclusively by the 
SNT, we find that it violated §2'09-a.l(d) of the Act. 
5/CPLR 3018. See Urraro v. Green, 106 A.D.2d 567 (2d Dep't 
1984) ; Ward v. Daveqa City Radio, 163 Misc. 335 (1937.) . 
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With respect to Case No. U-14052, it is alleged that during 
the summer of 1992, the District assigned unit work to nonunit 
employees and that the Association did not discover these 
assignments until November 1992. The Assistant Director 
determined that the record established that the events complained 
of in the charge occurred in June 1992 and the events complained 
of in the amendment to the charge, filed in January 1993, 
occurred in August and September 1992. He further held that the 
Association had not produced any evidence that it did not learn 
and could not have learned of these assignments until November 
1992. As the original charge in Case No. U-14 052 was not filed 
until November 23, 1992, he found that the Association had not 
complied with the requirements of §3813 of the Education Law 
because it had not filed a notice of claim on the District and it 
had not filed an improper practice charge within the ninety-day 
time frame permitted under Deposit, supra. The Association 
focuses on the failure of the District to raise timeliness as a 
defense in its answer and our finding that the charge in Case No. 
U-13923 met the Education Law §3813 filing requirements. 
Asserting that the allegations in Case No. U-14 052 are virtually 
identical to those in Case No. U-13 92 3, the Association argues 
that the Assistant Director erred in finding that the charge and 
amendment in Case No. U-14052 were not in compliance with 
Education Law §3813. These arguments are without merit. 
The District timely raised its Education Law §3813 defense. 
It did not need to further assert that the charge was untimely 
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under PERB's Rules of Procedure to raise the notice of claim 
defense. The filing periods for filing a charge and filing a 
notice of claim are dissimilar, as are the defenses themselves. 
Compliance with- one filing period does not necessarily mean that 
there has been compliance with the other. On its face, the charge 
in Case No. U-14 052 is timely filed pursuant to our Rules. 
However, based on the Assistant Director's finding that the 
Association knew or should have known of the at-issue assignments 
of unit work to nonunit personnel before November 19 92 when the 
charge was filed, we affirm his determination that the charge was 
not filed within the ninety-day time period required by Education 
Law §3813 and, therefore, was properly dismissed.-7 That the 
allegations in Case No. U-14052 and the amendment thereto are 
similar to the allegations in Case No. U-1392 3, which was found to 
be in compliance with the requirements of Education Law §3813, is 
not sufficient to establish that Case No. U-14052 satisfied the 
notice of claim requirements of that statute solely because of the 
similarities in the pleadings. The charges are separate and each 
had to have satisfied the Education Law §3813 requirements. That 
one improper practice charge satisfies Education Law §3813 does 
not mean that another charge filed later is exempt from 
?/The amendment to Case No. U-14052 was filed on January 13, 
1993, and refers to events which occurred between June 30 and 
September 10, 1992, but alleges that the Association did not 
learn of the alleged improper conduct until November 1992. The 
Assistant Director found that the Association knew or should have 
known of the alleged violations at the times they occurred. 
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those requirements or has had those requirements satisfied by the 
notice of claim associated with the first. 
Based on the foregoing, we, therefore, grant the 
Association's exceptions and reverse the Assistant Director's 
decision in Case No. U-13923. The Association's exceptions in 
Case No. U-14 052 are denied and the Assistant Director's decision 
in that case is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally assigning 
nonunit employees to assist the school physician in the 
conduct of the summer student athletic physicals; 
2. Make Lynne Dionne whole for any wages and benefits lost 
as a result of the District's assignment of nonunit 
employees to assist the school physician in the conduct 
of the summer student athletic physicals, with interest 
at the current prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations 
regularly used to communicate with employees in the 
unit represented by the Association. 
DATED: May 15, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
JPAJL £vf\&il 
Pa'uline R. tinsel la", Chairperson 
Eric^J." Schmertz, Mem^fer 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Sidney Teachers Association that the Sidney Central School 
District will: 
1. Not unilaterally assign nonunit employees to assist the school physician in the conduct of the 
summer student athletic physicals. 
2. Make Lynne Dionne whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the District's 
assignment of nonunit employees to assist the school physician in the conduct of the 
summer student athletic physicals, with interest at the current prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
SIDNEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
f ny other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PETER REESE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-167 49 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO and 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH), 
Respondents. 
PETER REESE, pro se 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE/ ESQ. (JEFFREY G. PLANT of counsel), 
for Respondent PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent STATE OF NEW YORK 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Peter Reese to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge he 
filed against the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) and 
the State of New York (Department of Health) (State). Reese 
alleges that PEF breached its duty of fair representation (DFR) 
in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by failing or refusing to take action to 
compel the State to adhere to the contractual time frames for 
decision on an out-of-title work grievance. The State is alleged 
to have violated §209-a.l(b) of the Act by acting "in concert" 
with PEF regarding its alleged noncompliance with the contractual 
time frames. 
; Board - U-16749 -2 
The ALJ dismissed the charge against PEF on the ground that 
the allegations in the charge, as supplemented by Reese's offer 
of proof, did not evidence a DFR breach. The charge against the 
State was dismissed because there was nothing pleaded which would 
evidence any collusion between PEF and the State for the purpose 
of delaying the disposition of Reese's grievance. 
Reese argues in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the charge. He argues that PEF's- inaction, which 
allowed the State to withhold a disposition of his grievance 
beyond the contractual time frames, in and of itself amounts to 
the arbitrary or bad faith conduct necessary to establish a DFR 
violation. PEF argues in response that the AKT's dismissal of 
1
 the charge represents a correct application of DFR principles and 
her decision should be affirmed. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
Reese filed his out-of-title work grievance pursuant to 
Article 17 of the PEF-State contract at step 2 on April 26, 1994. 
The contract provides that a step 2 determination is to be made 
"as promptly as possible, but no later than ten working days 
after receipt of the grievance unless PEF or the employee agrees 
to an extension of such time limit." The step 2 decision was 
rendered October 11, 1994, after a hearing on August 11, 1994. 
Reese alleges that he did not agree to an extension of time 
for a step 2 decision, did not authorize any extension, and 
j 
neither, to his knowledge, did PEF agree to an extension except 
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to the extent it allegedly did not take any action to hold the 
State to the step 2 time limits. 
Only PEF may appeal to step 3, which it did on or about 
October 18, 1994. The step 3 procedure calls for the Director of 
the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (GOER), or the 
Director's designee, to promptly forward the grievance to the 
Department of Civil Service's Director of Classification and 
Compensation for a review and a determination as to whether the 
duties at issue are out-of-title. Under the contract, the 
Director of Classification and Compensation "will make every 
reasonable effort to complete such review promptly". The 
Director of Classification and Compensation's findings are sent 
to the Director of GOER, who then is to issue a step 3 
determination "forthwith". The step 3 determination, favorable 
to Reese, was rendered January 13, 1995. 
For purposes of this appeal, we, as did the ALT, assume the 
truth of Reese's allegations and afford him the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences therefrom. Therefore, we assume that PEF 
did not take any affirmative action to secure compliance with the 
contractual time limits and did not affirmatively and 
specifically consent to.an extension of those time limits. 
Against this set of assumptions, the question becomes 
whether PEF was under a DFR duty to take some action seeking to 
compel the State to adhere to the contractual time limits 
because, until such time as his grievance was finally decided, 
Reese was required to do the duties which were ultimately found 
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to be out-of-title. As the duties which Reese was required to 
perform were appropriate to a salary grade lower than his grade 
35, the PEF-State contract prohibits any monetary award; the 
assignment may be and was only ordered discontinued. Given this 
inability to provide him with make-whole relief, Reese argues 
that PEF should be held to a statutory duty to enforce the 
contractual time limits because each day beyond those limits was 
another day that he was forced to perform lower-rated duties 
without effective remedy. 
A union violates its duty of fair representation only by 
conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Reese offers no facts which would even suggest discriminatory or 
bad faith motivation. There is no claim of disparate treatment. 
We are left, therefore, to decide whether, as a matter of law, 
PEF's assumed declination to undertake action to compel 
compliance with the contractual time limits for the disposition 
of Reese's grievance can be considered arbitrary. On the time 
frames submitted here, we think not. 
Our decisions have always recognized that a union is and 
must be afforded a wide range of reasonableness in making 
decisions associated with the processing of a grievance.-7 By 
Reese's own allegations, the time it took for final disposition 
of his grievance was "typical" of all out-of-title work 
grievances between PEF and the State. What PEF has done 
^See, e.g. , District Council 37, AFSCME, 28 PERB ?[3062 (1995) . 
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according to Reese's allegations is to have tacitly consented to 
an extension of the contractual time limits. Just as a union and 
an employer may fix the time lines for the filing, prosecution 
and decision of grievances, so too may they thereafter in good 
faith extend or modify them either generally or specifically. 
Parties to a bargaining relationship often fix contractual time 
lines for grievance processing, but just as often they thereafter 
waive or modify those time lines to conform to the realities of 
the work place, which often engender delays in grievance 
processing. Reese's own allegations reflect an awareness of that 
circumstance when he asserts that his grievance was typical of 
all out-of-title work grievances under the State-PEF contract. 
Notwithstanding that awareness, he appears to argue that PEF owed 
him a duty which it might not owe other grievants because there 
was no effective remedy for him, only the possibility of an order 
directing the State to discontinue the out-of-title work 
assignment. But all grievants are similarly situated to Reese in 
the sense that their contract rights are also abridged for 
however long it takes for a grievance to be decided in their 
favor. In net effect, therefore, an acceptance of Reese's 
arguments would compel us to create a broad duty upon unions to 
generally undertake actions upon a grievant's demand to secure 
strict compliance with contractual time limits. We do not 
believe that the policies of the Act are favorably advanced by 
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the creation of such a per se duty.-7 Such a duty would erode a 
significant part of a union's discretion regarding the processing 
of grievances. Moreover, it would ultimately cause unions and 
employers never to agree to any time frames for grievance 
processing or decision to avoid any claim that nonadherence to 
those time frames is improper. 
Our decision is further guided by the realization that, as 
PEF argues, there were no practical mechanisms available to PEF 
to compel compliance with the contractual time limits. The 
State's alleged failure to abide by the contractual time lines 
for decision of the out-of-title work grievance was probably 
itself grievable, but by the time such a grievance worked its way 
through the multiple steps of the contract, including 
arbitration, the underlying out-of-title work grievance would 
surely have been decided. 
Although we find no DFR breach in PEF's assumed failure to 
compel the State's strict compliance to the contract's terms, the 
charge is also susceptible to a reading that the time it actually 
took for completion of this particular grievance was so long as 
to be arbitrary. Reese's grievance to final decision favorable 
to him took approximately nine months. The proceedings involved 
two stages, a hearing, and the involvement by persons beyond 
PEF's control, including persons outside the facility and at 
-^Accord Teamsters Local 355, 95 LRRM 1232 (1977) (union's 
failure to demand compliance with a contract provision held no 
violation where the provision was not enforced or invoked on a 
regular basis). 
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least one who is not directly accountable to either of the 
parties to the contract. Under such circumstances, we cannot 
hold that the processing of his grievance took so long as to be 
held arbitrary. 
The dismissal of the allegations against the State was 
plainly correct. There were no facts alleged to support a 
finding of collusion between the State and PEF. Absent evidence 
of such collusion, the charge pleads, at most, a contract 
violation by the State which does not give rise to any statutory 
improper practice. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 15, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
1 
insella,"Chairperson 
^^C^O^iyV^ 
Eric J/i' Schmertz, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Town of Penfield (Town) by motion seeks permission to 
appeal from a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) denying 
the Town's request that the AKT recuse herself from this case. 
The underlying charge, filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) alleges 
that a Town employee was ^ issued a counseling memorandum because 
she attended a PERB proceeding pursuant to subpoena issued by an 
attorney for CSEA.-7 The Town's action allegedly violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). The charge was later amended to allege that the 
-
7The proceeding was in conjunction with a pending representation 
case involving the Town. CSEA lost a representation election 
held on April 24, 1996, but it has filed objections to the 
election which are currently pending. 
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employee was given a false and unfavorable evaluation because of 
her organizing activities on behalf of CSEA and her attendance at 
the PERB proceeding. 
The case was originally scheduled for hearing on 
February 27, 1996. The Town's representative-7' requested a two-
week adjournment.of that date to investigate the amended 
allegations and to prepare its witnesses in response thereto. 
The ALT rescheduled the hearing to March 8, 1996. The ALJ 
cancelled the March 8 date because of adverse weather conditions 
in the Buffalo area, which she believed might prevent the Town 
from traveling from Rochester and CSEA from Albany. The hearing 
was rescheduled to March 21, 199 6, and it was at that hearing 
that the ALJ denied the Town's request that she recuse herself. 
A second day of hearing has been scheduled for early June 1996. 
The Town alleges that the ALT's conduct beginning in 
February 1996 "has brought into question her neutrality and 
objectivity". The following conduct is cited by the Town in 
support of its recusal request: the ALJ's suggestion to the Town 
that it settle the case by rescinding the counseling memorandum; 
her raising of an issue for hearing that, up to that time, had 
not been raised by CSEA; her adjournment of the February 27 
hearing to a date less than the two weeks from that date as the 
Town had requested, coupled with a statement that no further 
-''Until this appeal, the Town was represented by a nonattorney. 
Counsel has been substituted after the motion before us was 
filed. 
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adjournments would be granted; and her weather-related 
adjournment of the March 8 hearing at CSEA's request. 
CSEA argues in response to the motion that we should not 
allow an interlocutory appeal because the circumstances do not 
warrant any deviation from our customary practice to deny such 
requests. It argues that the Town's motion is "frivolous" and 
intended only to "protract the improper practice case". CSEA 
argues that the ALJ's statements and rulings do not evidence any 
favoritism towards CSEA or bias against the Town and do not 
prevent the Town from having a fair hearing with a decision on 
the record facts and prevailing law. 
Permission to appeal from the ALJ's ruling is by permission 
only pursuant to §204.7(h)(2) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
We have held repeatedly that we will not grant permission for 
such appeals except in extraordinary circumstances.-7 In State 
of New York (Bruns)f-' we held specifically that an 
interlocutory appeal from an ALJ's declination to recuse will be 
permitted only if the allegations would require disqualification 
of the ALT. The allegations made to us here do not set forth any 
basis upon which it must be concluded either that a fair decision 
cannot be reached or that there is any per se basis presented for 
recusal. The Town's bias allegations are substantially similar 
to the allegations raised in State of New York (Bruns). There, 
-''See, e.g. , Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist. , 28 PERB 
1[3034 (1995) . 
^25 PERB [^3007 (1992) . 
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too, the alleged bias was premised upon the ALJ's rulings and 
conduct in processing the charge. We denied permission to appeal 
in State of New York (Bruns) on the ground that the allegations 
were not of a type requiring the ALJ's disqualification and we 
reach the same conclusion here. Our denial of the Town's motion 
is without prejudice to its right to file exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision pursuant to §2 04.10 of the Rules. 
DATED: May 15, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
M ^ ^ t .Ure0 
\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric Cy. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4496 
WEEDSPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of 
counsel), for Petitioner. 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, ESQ. for Employer. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 3, 1996, the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Weedsport 
Central School District. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating was 
appropriate: 
Included: School Bus Driver, Custodian, Building Maintenance 
Helper and Building Maintenance Person. 
Excluded: Head Bus Driver, Head Building Maintenance Person 
and all other employees of the District. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on April 29, 1996, at which eight ballots were cast in favor 
of representation by the petitioner and twelve ballots were cast 
against representation by the petitioner.^ 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: Albany, New York, 
May 15, 1996 
x 
ussrf/f U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
EricrJ. Schmertz, Member 
i/ One person, who was not on the list of eligible voters, cast 
a challenged ballot. There are 20 employees in the 
stipulated unit. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4460 
VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of°Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
Certification - C-4460 - 2 -
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time Constables and part-time Code 
Enforcement Officers in the Village of 
Patchogue. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
1 STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE POLICE SUPERVISORS 
ASSOCIATION, IUPA, LOCAL 93, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4502 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE 
POLICE), 
Employer, 
-and-
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All members of the Division of State Police in 
the following titles: Major, Captain, 
Lieutenant, Technical Lieutenant, Station 
Commander, Sergeant, Technical Sergeant, Zone 
Sergeant, First Sergeant, Chief Technical 
Sergeant and Staff Sergeant. 
Excluded: All other employees of the Division. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS ASSOCIATION, IUPA, 
LOCAL 81, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4513 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE 
POLICE), 
Employer, 
-and-
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
Certification - C-4513 - 2 -
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Troopers. 
Excluded: All other employees of the Division. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 15, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
80 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205-2604 
(518) 457-2690 
May 1 7 , 1996 
RICHARD A. CURRERI 
DIRECTOR OF CONCILIATION 
A. Thomas Van Wart II 
Old Roaring Brook Road 
Mt. Kisco, NY 10549 
Dear Mr. Van Wart: 
The Board has instructed me to inform you that, at its 
regular meeting of May 15, 1996, and after review of all 
correspondence related to your conduct in Town of New Paltz 
XKochl, PERB Case No. A95-031, it removed your name from PERB's 
roster of grievance arbitrators. The Board's action is 
specifically grounded in your continued refusal to issue a 
decision and award in said case until you receive compensation 
for services rendered in unrelated assignments. You were advised 
by my letters to you of February 8 and March 4, 1996 that such 
conduct was not acceptable, and were asked to render your award 
by March 25, 1996. You were also advised that failure to do so 
could result in the action the Board has now taken regarding your 
panel status. 
The Board has further instructed me to remind you that 
removal from the panel has no bearing upon your existing 
professional responsibilities, which include issuance of the 
decision and award in the aforementioned arbitration proceeding. 
Very truly yours, 
RACrjhs 
cc: Pauline R. Kinsella^ 
Eric J. Schmertz / 
Patti Lou Zabawczuk 
Richard A. Curreri 
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